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Abstract
Background: Tiered pricing - the concept of selling drugs and vaccines in developing countries at prices
systematically lower than in industrialized countries - has received widespread support from industry, policymakers,
civil society, and academics as a way to improve access to medicines for the poor. We carried out case studies
based on a review of international drug price developments for antiretrovirals, artemisinin combination therapies,
drug-resistant tuberculosis medicines, liposomal amphotericin B (for visceral leishmaniasis), and pneumococcal
vaccines.
Discussion: We found several critical shortcomings to tiered pricing: it is inferior to competition for achieving the
lowest sustainable prices; it often involves arbitrary divisions between markets and/or countries, which can lead to
very high prices for middle-income markets; and it leaves a disproportionate amount of decision-making power in
the hands of sellers vis-à-vis consumers. In many developing countries, resources are often stretched so tight that
affordability can only be approached by selling medicines at or near the cost of production. Policies that “de-link”
the financing of R&D from the price of medicines merit further attention, since they can reward innovation while
exploiting robust competition in production to generate the lowest sustainable prices. However, in special cases -
such as when market volumes are very small or multi-source production capacity is lacking - tiered pricing may
offer the only practical option to meet short-term needs for access to a product. In such cases, steps should be
taken to ensure affordability and availability in the longer-term.
Summary: To ensure access to medicines for populations in need, alternate strategies should be explored that
harness the power of competition, avoid arbitrary market segmentation, and/or recognize government
responsibilities. Competition should generally be the default option for achieving affordability, as it has proven
superior to tiered pricing for reliably achieving the lowest sustainable prices.
Keywords: Essential Medicines, Tiered Pricing, Differential Pricing, Access to Medicines, Developing Countries, Low-
and Middle-income countries (LMIC), Drugs, Pharmaceuticals, Market segmentation
Background
“Access to drugs cannot depend on the decisions of
private companies
but is also a government responsibility.”
- WHO Commission on Intellectual Property
Rights, Innovation and Public Health (WHO
2006)
The concept of selling essential medicines (drugs and
vaccines) in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs)
[1] at prices systematically lower than those in industria-
lized countries–a practice known as tiered pricing–has
received widespread support from industry, policy-
makers, civil society, and academics as a way to improve
access to these life-saving products. International tiered
pricing has been proposed as an alternative to high
prices when separable high- and low-to-middle-income
markets exist for a medicine and when the seller exerts
significant power over pricing, such as when there is
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exclusivity, or other market-entry barriers [2].
Medicines are being patented more widely in develop-
ing countries with the implementation of the World
Trade Organization Agreement on Trade Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). At the
same time, the pharmaceutical market and industry is
increasingly globalizing, competitive pharmaceutical pro-
ducers in LMICs are emerging, unmet health needs in
the developing world remain immense, and political
demand for access to new products offering significant
therapeutic advance is likely to grow [3]. Against this
background, assessing if and how tiered pricing supports
globally equitable access to medicines is critical.
Although “s t i l lv e r ym u c hi ni t si n f a n c y[ 4 ] ,“ tiered
pricing has attracted increased attention both in the
pharmaceutical sector and among public actors [5-8].
The business case for tiered pricing is strong: when
markets can be separated, adapting the product price to
the consumer’s willingness or ability to pay is a profit-
maximizing strategy. At the same time, adopting such
pricing can increase consumer welfare by bringing pre-
viously unaffordable products within reach. In short,
tiered pricing of pharmaceuticals has received wide-
spread support as a “win-win-win” approach to addres-
sing access issues [9].
However, evidence and experience suggest that, in
practice, tiered pricing has a number of significant
drawbacks. Examining specific drug-pricing case studies,
we offer here a critique of tiered pricing, organized
around three key questions: (1) How can medicines be
made affordable in LMICs? (2) Who should pay for
research and development (R&D) and how much? (3)
Who decides pricing and how?
Discussion
Key Concepts
Tiered pricing versus equity pricing
Various terms are often used synonymously with, or are
related to, tiered pricing [8], including “differential pri-
cing, ““ market segmentation, ““ price discrimination, “
and less frequently “Ramsey pricing [2,10].” We use the
term “tiered pricing” to refer to the practice of systema-
tically setting higher prices in higher-income markets
and lower prices in lower-income markets, such that
there is some positive correlation between price and
income. Notably, tiered pricing does not necessarily
imply that a price is equitable or affordable; rather, it
simply means that different prices are charged to differ-
ent segments of the market for the same product.
In contrast, the concept of “equity pricing” focuses on
affordability and is closely linked to the World Health
Organization (WHO) concept of essential medicines,
which are “intended to be available within the context
of functioning health systems at all times in adequate
amounts...at a price the individual and the community
can afford [11].” Equity pricing emphasizes the perspec-
tive of the consumer, ie, whether a price is affordable
and acceptable to him or her. In contrast, tiered pricing
emphasizes the perspective of the producer, ie, whether
a fair profit can be sustained while charging lower prices
to lower-income populations. While tiered pricing may
lead to equitable prices, the concepts are not equivalent
and there is no guarantee that tiered prices are
affordable.
Affordability
When is a medicine price equitable or affordable? Mea-
suring affordability is not straightforward and depends
on various factors, including the purchaser (eg, indivi-
dual, household, community, private insurer, national
health system, or international donor) and product spe-
cificities (eg, whether the expense is one-time or
recurring).
Different approaches to measuring affordability have
been proposed, including benchmarking medicine prices
against per capita gross national income (GNI), setting
prices against “catastrophic” household health expendi-
ture levels [12], or converting prices to working days
based on government salaries as a proxy for average
income [13]. However, since these methods do not
account for widely varying levels of income inequality in
different countries [14], Niëns et al. developed a metho-
dology to measure affordability based on the proportion
of a population that would be pushed below a poverty
line (either $1.25 or $2 per capita/day) by the purchase
of a medicine, ie, “the impoverishing effect of a medi-
cine.” [15] This methodology offers the advantage of
comparability across time and countries using available
data, while being sensitive to widely varying income dis-
tributions within countries.
Regardless of the range of possible measures of afford-
ability, actually achieving or approaching affordability,
particularly for the poorest populations, likely requires
attaining the lowest sustainable price, which approaches
the cost of production in a competitive market. We
define “lowest sustainable price” here as one that pro-
vides sufficient profit to the producer to incentivize
ongoing production.
Evidence from Drug Pricing Case Studies
We reviewed experiences with tiered pricing over the
past decade across a diverse set of products, including
antiretrovirals for HIV/AIDS, artemisinin-combination
therapy for malaria, treatments for drug-resistant tuber-
culosis, drugs for visceral leishmaniasis, and the pneu-
mococcal vaccine; we found that each case offered
distinct insights regarding the relative utility of tiered
pricing, as detailed in the following sections.
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Among different therapeutic areas, the availability of
data and analysis on tiered pricing is greatest for HIV/
AIDS. In a review of over 7,000 developing-country pur-
chase transactions from 2002-2007, Waning et al. found
that the tiered prices for 15 of 18 antiretroviral (ARV)
drugs were 23-498% higher than the generic price [16].
As of mid-2011, of the three products for which tiered
prices were lower than generic prices, two products now
have lower-cost generics available.
Similarly, an analysis of publicly announced prices
found that of the 30 products for which both originator
tiered prices and WHO pre-qualified generic prices
were listed, the generic price was lower for 27 products
(90%) [17]. In at least one case, the generic price fell
between the originator’s Category 1 (roughly, lower-
income countries) and Category 2 (roughly, middle-
income countries) tiered price.
Finally, medicines prices tend to fall further when
more competitors enter the market [18] (Figure 1),
though the optimal number of competitors for a given
product market will depend on a number of factors,
including market size, economies of scale in production,
and regulatory measures to prevent oligopolistic or col-
lusive pricing [19,20].
O v e r a l l ,t h ee v i d e n c ef r o mA R V ss t r o n g l ys u g g e s t s
that generic prices are generally lower than tiered prices,
and that competition among multiple producers system-
atically results in dynamic price reductions.
The special case of lopinavir/ritonavir The price his-
tory of the fixed-dose combination (FDC) ARV lopina-
vir/ritonavir (LPV/r; Kaletra
®) merits special attention,
both for its complexity and the lessons it holds regard-
ing the potential pitfalls of tiered pricing. LPV/r is a cri-
tical drug for second-lineH I V / A I D St r e a t m e n t ;t h e
2009 WHO HIV/AIDS treatment guidelines recommend
Figure 1 Number of competing WHO-prequalified suppliers by antiretroviral product. All prices are per patient/per year. 3TC = lamivudine
150 mg; NVP = nevirapine 200 mg; EFV = efavirenz 600 mg; AZT = zidovudine 300 mg; ABC = abacavir 300 mg; TDF = tenofovir 300 mg; d4T =
stavudine 30 mg; LPV/r = lopinavir/ritonavir 200/50 mg; ddI = didanosine 400 mg enteric coated; ATV = atazanavir 150 mg; RTV = ritonavir 100
mg; RAL = raltegravir 400 mg; ETV = etravirine 100 mg; DRV = darunavir 300 mg. Source: MSF 2011 [17]
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which must be taken together with ritonavir but is not
yet available as an FDC with ritonavir [21]. Since 2006,
LPV/r has been available in a heat-stable formulation
that is well-suited for settings where refrigeration is
scarce. LPV/r is by far the most widely used PI in devel-
oping countries, administered to 93% of adults on sec-
ond-line treatment [22].
Abbott Laboratories holds the patents on lopinavir
and ritonavir and initially announced a tiered price of
$650 for LPV/r in 2001 for African countries and 16
non-African least developed countries (LDCs) [23]. In
2002, Abbott announced a price drop to $500 for all
African countries and LDCs (Category 1 countries).
From 2002-2009, Abbott’s price for Category 1 countries
did not change (Figure 2). During this period, the lowest
generic price for LPV/r remained above $500, ie, no
effective price competition existed in the market. In
August 2009, the Clinton HIV/AIDS Initiative (CHAI)
announced that generic LPV/r would be available at
$470, the first time the generic price fell below Abbott’s
tiered price. Several weeks later, for the first time in 7
years, Abbott reduced its price, dropping it to $440, or
slightly below the lowest generic price. This history sug-
gests that producers do not have strong incentives to
reduce tiered prices in the absence of competition, nor
are tiered prices immune to competition when it does
arise.
While Category 1 countries received the lowest global
price for LPV/r for a number of years, excluded coun-
tries negotiated prices with Abbott case by case, often
resulting in very high prices. For example, in 2005 the
price of LPV/r offered to Médecins Sans Frontières
(MSF) programs in China was $5,000 [24], while in
2006 Honduras paid $7,775. Under strong civil society
pressure, in 2006 Abbott offered a Category 2 tiered
p r i c eo f$ 2 , 2 0 0f o rag r o u po f4 0d e v e l o p i n gc o u n t r i e s
excluded from its initial offer. However, some govern-
ments considered this price too high, and after Thailand
issued a compulsory license on the drug in January
2007, Abbott dropped the Category 2 price again by
more than half to $1,000. As of July 2010, the price has
remained at $1,000 for a group of 45 LMICs. The pri-
cing of LPV/r for non-Category 1 countries illustrates
the difficulty of setting equitable and affordable tiered
prices across diverse country contexts.
Finally, tiered pricing may have anti-competitive
e f f e c t si ft h ep r i c ei ss ol o wt h a ti td i s c o u r a g e sm a r k e t
entry by potential competitors. Abbott controlled 80-
100% (by volume) of the developing-country LPV/r mar-
ket from 2006 to 2008 [25]. Abbott’s dominance in this
market contrasts with other ARVs, in which generics
supply 80% or more of the developing-country market
(by volume). Questions have been raised regarding
whether the company’s pricing policies were intended to
prevent competition [26-28]. While consumers may ben-
efit in the short term from tiered prices set below pro-
duction costs, the resultant lack of competition and
absence of dynamic price reductions means that consu-
mers may pay higher prices in the long term.
Malaria: Artemisinin-based Combination Therapies
As with ARVs, evidence from the market for artemisi-
nin-based combination therapy (ACT) drugs for malaria
shows that generic competition yields lower prices than
tiered pricing alone.
In 2001, Novartis offered WHO an “at-cost” tiered
price for developing countries of $2.40 per adult treat-
ment course for artemether-lumefantrine (AL;
Figure 2 Lopinavir/ritonavir price trends, 2002-2009. Source: MSF 2010 [17]
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®) [29]. For several years, AL was the only
fixed-dose combination ACT that met the quality
requirements of the WHO or Global Fund to Fight
AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM); therefore,
no competition existed in the donor-funded ACT mar-
ket. The tiered price did not change for 5 years (Figure
3) [30]. After a generic version of AL became eligible
for GFATM purchase, Novartis decreased its price to
$1.80, then dropped its tiered price again to $1.50
shortly after the FDC of artesunate-amodiaquine
(ASAQ), a substitute and competitor to AL in some
countries, entered the market at $1.00.
Evidence from the global ACT market suggests that
competition helps reduce tiered prices, and underscores
the need to ensure that “at-cost” pricing is indepen-
dently verifiable and reflects changes in production
costs over time.
Tuberculosis: Medicines for Drug-Resistant Disease
Most medicines for tuberculosis (TB) are widely avail-
able as low-cost generics, but some medicines for drug-
resistant TB (DR-TB, including multidrug-resistant and
extensively drug-resistant TB) can be quite costly, and
may be offered at a tiered price. Eli Lilly produced two
key DR-TB drugs, capreomycin and cycloserine, which
are off patent but not widely available from other sup-
pliers. In 2002, Lilly began supplying the drugs at a
“preferential price” through the WHO Green Light
Committee (GLC), and transferred the technology to
produce the drugs and its active pharmaceutical ingredi-
ent (API) to several generic drug companies in TB-
endemic countries. Unlike for ARVs or ACTs, the tiered
price has consistently remained below the generic prices
for these drugs.
Capreomycin: As of September 2011, no generic
sources of capreomycin were WHO Pre-Qualified (PQ).
In 2001, GLC-approved programmes were able to access
Lilly’s capreomycin for $1.02 per vial. Since 2001, the
price has increased nearly four-fold to $4.00 per vial for
the WHO Global Drug Facility [31]. A further price
increase is expected in the near future, now that Lilly
has stopped production for this market, and the GDF
begins sourcing capreomycin from the pharmaceutical
producer Akorn, which has reported a price of $8 per
vial (Table 1) [31]. While the Akorn price to the GDF is
still relatively high, it is lower than the price found in
industrialized countries of $40.95 per vial [32].
Cycloserine: By 2009, after technology transfer from
Lilly, two generic WHO prequalified sources of cycloser-
ine were available. In 2001, GLC-approved programmes
were able to access Lilly’s cycloserine for $0.14 per cap-
sule, but in 2008 Lilly stopped producing the drug. The
price of cycloserine has since increased by over four-
fold to $0.59 per capsule (Table 2) [31]. However this
price remains considerably more affordable than prices
paid in high-income countries; for example, the British
National Formulary lists a price of $5.43 per capsule
[32].
This experience suggests that under special circum-
stances tiered pricing may result in lower prices than
competitive production. When demand is low and pro-
duction capacity limited, a single producer selling at
tiered prices in developing countries may result in lower
prices than would otherwise be feasible. Notably, the
GLC has approved a cumulative total of only 49,858
patient treatments from 2000-2008 [33]. In 2009, only
30,475 of the estimated 440,000 new patients with MDR
Figure 3 Artemisinin-based combination therapy drug price trends 2001-2008. Source: Moon et al. 2009 [30]
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DR TB drugs is growing, the patient numbers remain
quite small. Generic prices may fall as global volumes
increase, producers achieve economies of scale, and/or
more producers of API or finished products enter the
market. Nevertheless, from 2000 when Lilly began sup-
plying capreomycin and cycloserine to the GLC, until
generic suppliers were able to takeover supply (2007 for
cycloserine, projected 2011 or later for capreomycin),
Lilly’s tiered price has likely helped to ease access pro-
blems related to the cost of DR-TB drugs.
Visceral Leishmaniasis: Liposomal Amphotericin B
Amphotericin B is used to treat fungal infections, as well
as visceral leishmaniasis (VL; kala azar), a fatal neglected
tropical disease highly endemic in India, Bangladesh,
Nepal, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Brazil. Amphotericin B is
better tolerated by patients who do not respond well to
sodium stibogluconate, the standard VL treatment in
some countries, and is recommended for treatment of
VL patients co-infected with HIV. Use of the liposomal
formulation of amphotericin B (AmBisome
®,p r o d u c e d
by Gilead Sciences) has significantly fewer side effects
than conventional amphotericin B [35].
In 1992, Gilead agreed with WHO to supply liposomal
amphotericin B (LAmB) for treatment of VL to develop-
ing countries at cost plus 10%, ie, $50/vial ($700/treat-
ment) (Table 3). In 2005, an informal WHO expert
consultation recommended using LAmB to treat VL and
highlighted the need for wider access. The following
year, Gilead and WHO agreed on a tiered price of $20/
vial for VL and mucosal leishmaniasis in developing
countries; in August 2009, Gilead reduced the price
further to $18/vial and committed to update the price
annually depending on its production cost, with a price
ceiling of $20 (personal communication, G. Alton,
2009). In India, Cipla marketed a generic LAmB version
for $140/vial and offered a specially discounted price for
VL treatment of $25/vial. The UK private sector price in
2010 was $153/vial.
T h ec a s eo fL A m Bs u g g e s t st h a ti ti sp o s s i b l et os e g -
ment markets by indication. However, similar discounts
are also needed for use against other fungal infections
such as meningococcal meningitis in people living with
HIV/AIDS, illustrating the public health limits of seg-
menting markets by indication. With only two produ-
cers, the market for this formulation is not yet
competitive; but in the medium term, if the market
expands and can attract more competitors, prices for
LAmB may decrease and make this drug more accessi-
ble for both patients with VL and those with other fun-
gal infections. In the short term, the tiered prices most
likely increased access to this medicine specifically for
the treatment of VL.
New Vaccines: Pneumococcal Vaccine
Older vaccines have long been available at relatively low
cost in developing countries. However, newer, more
expensive vaccines have been recently developed, such
as for rotavirus, human papillomavirus, and pneumonia,
raising questions regarding access in developing coun-
tries. In 2010, controversy arose around the tiered pri-
cing of pneumococcal vaccines.
For three decades, the Pan American Health Organi-
zation (PAHO) has procured vaccines at low prices for
Latin America through its Revolving Fund; by aggregat-
ing demand across a set of small- and medium-sized
countries, the Revolving Fund strengthened the nego-
tiating leverage of governments vis-à-vis suppliers.
Revolving Fund contracts include a “most favored
Table 1 Capreomycin tiered prices
Manufacturers Akorn Mac Leods GDF pooled procurement price
Quality status Approved by a Stringent Regulatory Authority Under evaluation by WHO PQ GDF Quality Assurance Policy
1 g powder for injection 8.00 No price information given 4.00*
(Eli Lilly)
Price and quality information. Price of the lowest unit (i.e. the price of one tablet, capsule or vial) in USD ($)
* In future, the lowest available price is expected to change as the Akorn product replaces Eli Lilly’s.
Sources: British National Formulary 2010 [32]; Global Fund 2010 [54]; Management Sciences for Health 2009 [55]; personal communication, M. Price, 2010.
Table 2 Cycloserine tiered prices
Manufacturers Lupin Aspen Mac Leods Purdue GMP GDF pooled
procurement price
Quality status Under evaluation by
WHO PQ
Approved by
WHO PQ
Approved by WHO
PQ
Approved by a Stringent Regulatory
Authority
GDF Quality Assurance
Policy
250 mg
capsule
0.60 0.78 No price information
given
No price information given 0.59 and 0.78
(Macleods and
Aspen)
Price and quality information. Price of the lowest unit (i.e. the price of one tablet, capsule or vial) in USD ($)
Sources: British National Formulary 2010 [32]; Global Fund 2010 [54]; Management Sciences for Health 2009 [56]; personal communication, M. Price, 2010.
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their lowest available price. However, with most Latin
American countries falling into the lower-middle or
upper-middle income categories, the requirement that
PAHO receive the lowest global prices has clashed with
producers’ tiered pricing strategies, which charge higher
prices to middle-income countries.
In 2008-2009, PAHO negotiated a price of $21.75/
dose for Wyeth’s pneumococcal 7-valent conjugate vac-
cine (Prevnar
®). A 10-valent vaccine protecting against
a broader range of serotypes was developed by GSK
(Synflorix
®), which will supply it through the Advance
Market Commitment (AMC) mechanism of the Global
Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI) for up
to 72 developing countries [36]. The initial price is $7/
dose for approximately 20% of the total quantity pro-
vided, which then decreases to a “tail” price of $3.50/
dose for the remainder [37]. PAHO could not obtain
the same price from GSK and initially decided not to
purchase the 10-valent vaccine.
In parallel, the government of Brazil negotiated an 8-
year agreement with GSK to purchase the 10-valent vac-
cine initially at $16/dose (Figure 4), decreasing to $7 in
later years; the beginning and tail prices are roughly dou-
ble the GAVI price. GSK has also agreed to transfer tech-
nology to the Brazilian public manufacturer
BioManguinhos to produce the vaccine by the end of the
8-year period. The same vaccine is sold at $49-56/dose in
Europe and $71/dose in the US [38]. The Brazil-GSK
agreement may have had a price setting effect for the
region as PAHO subsequently accepted a price of $14.85/
dose. GSK furthermore succeeded in separating the GAVI
and PAHO markets with two different presentations of
the same vaccine (two and one dose vials respectively).
The pneumococcal vaccine case highlights several dif-
ficulties with tiered pricing. First, no mechanism is in
Table 3 Liposomal amphotericin B tiered prices (prices in USD ($)
Average unit price
(year)*
Average treatment cost
(year)
Liposomal amphotericin B Gilead Lowest generic (Cipla VL price) Gilead Lowest generic (Cipla VL price)
WHO 18 (2009) 25 (2008) 252 (2009) 350 (2008)
20 (2006) 280 (2006)
50 (1991) 700
† (1991)
UK private market 153 (2010) 2,142 (2010)
*Currency converted using http://www.oanda.com on 13 December 2010.
† Based on an average weight of 35 kg for a patient with visceral leishmaniasis, 14 vials are required for a full treatment course.
VL = visceral leishmaniasis.
Sources: personal communication, G. Alton, 2009.
Figure 4 Pneumococcal conjugate vaccine tiered prices.
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sible prices. Under the AMC/GAVI agreement, the price
of the pneumococcal vaccine is fixed at $7, then $3.50
for the next 10 years, but the production cost has been
estimated at $1-3/dose [39], suggesting that prices
would have fallen further over time in a competitive
market. These price differences may be particularly
important for LMICs that will become ineligible for
GAVI funding in the coming years, and will therefore
need to pay for vaccines from national budgets. Second,
this case underscores the difficulty in determining what
is a “fair” price for middle-income countries. Finally, the
Brazil-GSK deal suggests that, while large countries with
domestic manufacturing capacity may be able to negoti-
ate acceptable prices and technology transfer agree-
ments, for smaller countries without production
capacity, the practice of negotiating prices country by
country may be less favorable.
In summary, when synthesizing the past decade’s
experience with tiered pricing in HIV/AIDS, malaria,
tuberculosis, visceral leishmaniasis and pneumococcal
vaccines, we found that when markets were sizeable and
multiple sources of production were available, tiered pri-
cing performed poorly compared to competitive produc-
tion in generating reliable and sustained price
reductions. We also found that in special cases, particu-
larly when markets were small, highly uncertain, where
production capacity was limited, or there was a time
delay to overcoming barriers to competition, tiered pri-
cing likely contributed to improved access in the short
term. However, beyond price, we also found that tiered
pricing raised further issues requiring consideration as
discussed in the following sections.
Tiering and Pricing: Variations vs Principles
Differential and Arbitrary Tiering Among Countries
Current tiered pricing policies take various approaches
to country classification. Drug companies rarely provide
an explicit rationale for why they offer their lowest
prices to some countries, somewhat higher prices for
others, and for still others negotiate prices on a case-by-
case basis. Some companies use World Bank income
classifications based on per capita GNI (low, lower-mid-
dle, upper-middle, and high-income), while others use
development indicators, such as the UN-designated
LDCs or the UN Development Programme’sH u m a n
Development Index. Finally, some companies offer their
lowest prices, such as for ARVs, to all sub-Saharan Afri-
can countries, regardless of income or LDC status, pre-
sumably because of the disproportionately high burden
of HIV in the region.
For example, for ARV pricing, Bristol-Myers Squibb
includes 57 developing countries in its Category 1, pri-
marily low-income and African countries, but places
southern African countries in Category 2. Southern
Africa, however, has the highest HIV-prevalence rates in
the world. The impact of this categorization is that Bris-
tol-Myers Squibb prices its important second-line drug
atazanavir 25% higher at $547 in southern Africa, com-
pared with $412 in other countries where HIV preva-
lence is lower and, in a few cases, income is higher [17].
Thus, tiered pricing policies are not necessarily logical
nor correlated with need or ability to pay, though that is
the purported objective. How companies decide to put
countries into different pricing tiers is not always clear,
nor is there consensus on the criteria by which to do so.
Intra-Country Price Differences
Within-country market segmentation In some cases,
within-country tiered pricing has been proposed and/or
implemented, and evidence suggests internal market
segmentation may be feasible. For example, Yadav has
presented evidence from the malaria drug market in
sub-Saharan Africa suggesting that price differences can
be maintained between “premium” and “non-premium”
private sector distribution channels, through branding
and other marketing strategies [40]. However, the distri-
butional effects of particular segmentation policies
should also be examined.
Perhaps the most common approach is to segment the
public and private sectors, with lower prices for govern-
ment-provided medicines. However, such a simple divi-
sion may not be equitable, since countries vary widely in
the extent to which a population purchases medicines in
the public or private sector, and private sector custo-
mers are not necessarily wealthier than those who rely
on the public sector. For example, over 70% of the TB
drug market in India and the Philippines is in the pri-
vate sector, while in Brazil and South Africa, TB drugs
are mostly dispensed via the public sector [41].
In addition, in a study of 36 countries Cameron et al.
found the availability of medicines to be higher in the
private than public sector, though public sector prices
tended to be lower [42]. Although incomes are generally
lower in rural areas, public health centers are often
sparse, meaning that poor, rural populations may rely
on private dispensaries to purchase medicines. Thus, a
tiered pricing model that only offers affordable prices to
the public sector could exclude a substantial proportion
of the poor population in some countries.
Another proposed method to achieve internal market
segmentation is to charge higher prices in the insured
market, while offering lower prices for all other sectors,
including public, private, and non-profit (personal com-
munication, K. Outterson, 2010). If such a policy could
feasibly be implemented, and if health insurance cover-
age were sufficient to pay for the prices of needed medi-
cines, then such a division could lead to more equitable
distributional outcomes than a simple public-private
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having extremely limited insurance systems with very
low coverage.
Within-country inequality A key weakness with pricing
medicines according to per capita GNI levels is that
many middle-income countries are also characterized by
high levels of inequality. South Africa and Brazil, for
example, are the 8
th and 10
th most unequal out of 182
ranked countries in the wor l d( T a b l e4 )[ 4 3 ] .T i e r e d
prices may be within reach for the upper or middle
classes in a country, but not for the poor. In a 2002
study of 13 countries, Wong found that medicine prices
were higher in countries with higher levels of inequality,
but per capita gross domestic product (GDP) had no
significant effect on price [44].
Setting Fair Prices: How and Who
With respect to tiered prices for middle-income coun-
tries, there is no norm for what constitutes a “fair” pre-
mium on LDC or low-income country prices. In
practice, prices may be determined by many factors
besides the ability to pay, such as negotiating capacity,
market size, and degree of competition.
For example, in 2006, Honduras purchased LPV/r at a
price about 6 times that of Brazil, although the two
countries’ adult HIV prevalence rates are roughly
equivalent (~0.5%) and Honduras’ per capita GNI is
only one-fourth that of Brazil’s. Brazil’sl a r g e rm a r k e t
and ability to credibly threaten the use of compulsory
licensing were likely to have contributed to the lower
prices achieved there [45].
In most high-income markets, governments play a
central role in regulating medicine prices, such as
through reference pricing, setting reimbursement rates,
and price controls. In contrast, smaller countries and
those without domestic pharmaceutical industries have
much less bargaining power and often face greater diffi-
culty achieving affordable prices in case-by-case price
negotiations with companies. Under tiered pricing poli-
cies, firms generally set the price and choose which
countries will receive which price. In short, tiered
pricing policies give most of the decision-making power
to private firms, whose pricing decisions may not neces-
sarily be aligned with the public interest.
Besides ability to pay, a range of factors could facilitate
fair price setting, including therapeutic or public health
value, drug production costs, total R&D costs, and pub-
lic investment in R&D. Lopert et al. proposed setting
tiered prices based on pharmacoeconomic principles
[46]: setting a fair, objectively calculated price taking
into account a product’s public health benefit, cost-ben-
efit ratio, availability of alternatives, potential cost sav-
ings in other parts of the healthcare system, and degree
of public or philanthropic R&D funding. Such a system
could shift the alignment of rewards for innovation clo-
ser to public health needs, rather than market profitabil-
ity. To our knowledge, this approach has not yet been
applied in developing countries, but such systems are in
place in the UK, Canada, and Australia, where national
governments are major purchasers of pharmaceuticals.
However, pharmacoeconomic approaches may need to
be combined with other measures to achieve equity pri-
cing of important medicines [47].
Summary
Contrary to the idea that tiered pricing is a “win-win”
solution, this review of the evidence and literature sug-
gests key economic and political drawbacks to this pol-
icy tool. Currently, there is no straightforward, equitable
way to set tiered prices to achieve affordability.
First, tiered pricing does not necessarily result in the
lowest sustainable prices, nor does it reliably lead to
price reductions over time. In comparison, when mar-
kets are sufficiently large and multiple sources of pro-
duction exist, robust competition has consistently
proven across different therapeutic areas to result in
lower prices. Second, no clear international norm has
been established for setting price tiers, nor is there a
simple or satisfactory way to allocate payment for R&D
costs across various developing countries. The distribu-
tional nature of the question is fundamentally political
rather than technical. Finally, tiered pricing policies give
too little decision-making power to governments, which
are accountable to their populations under international
law for ensuring access to medicines. Rather, tiered pri-
cing leaves this important issue almost entirely in the
hands of private companies over which populations have
few means to demand accountability.
In special cases however, such as when market
volumes are very small or highly uncertain (eg, drug-
resistant TB) and/or multisource production capacity is
lacking (eg, newer products like the pneumococcal vac-
cine), tiered pricing may offer the only practical short-
term option to increase access to a product. In such
cases, tiered pricing should be implemented in the short
Table 4 Selection of intra-country inequality scores
Country Gini coefficient Rank Income category
Namibia 74.3 1
st, most unequal Upper middle
South Africa 57.8 8
th Upper middle
Brazil 57.0 10
th Upper middle
China 46.9 58
th Lower middle
East Timor 39.5 71
st, median Lower middle/LDC
India 36.8 87
th Lower middle
Bangladesh 33.4 124
th Low income/LDC
Denmark 24.7 182
nd, most equal High income
LDC = least developed country
Source: UNDP 2009 [43]
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Page 9 of 11term, while simultaneous steps are taken to improve
affordability and availability over the longer term.
Where markets are small and economies of scale make
a single producer the most efficient solution, credible
means to verify “at-cost” or “cost-plus” supply commit-
ments are needed. In cases where global production
capacity is limited, policies should encourage rapid tech-
nology transfer to transition as quickly as possible to a
competitive market. In general, competition should be
the default option for improving the affordability of
medicines in developing countries. Increasingly, ensur-
ing such competition will require addressing the chal-
lenges posed by more widespread patenting of
medicines in developing countries [48]. These conclu-
sions have particular policy relevance for major purcha-
sers of medicines, who have the power to shape markets
for these products; such actors include governments of
large developing countries and global health initiatives
such as GAVI, the Global Fund (which has a Market
Dynamics Committee), UNITAID (which is centrally-
focused on market dynamics), and the United Nations
Childrens Fund (UNICEF).
If not tiered pricing, then what? Given the many difficul-
ties around setting tiered prices, pricing through competi-
tion offers clear advantages. Making competitively
produced medicines available in all developing countries
would minimize the complications of internal market seg-
mentation, since the lowest prices would be available
across all sectors. Policies enabling such competition merit
further attention. Such policies may include voluntary
measures by patent holders such as widespread voluntary
licensing, participating in the UNITAID-supported Medi-
cines Patent Pool [49], non-assert declarations, or deci-
sions not to apply for or maintain patents in developing
countries. They may also include policies adopted by gov-
ernments, such as regular compulsory licensing where
patents exist, or limiting patent grants through strict
patentability criteria and procedures to facilitate pre- and
post-grant oppositions on patent applications.
However, such a system will only work in the long term
if markets are large enough and alternate solutions for
financing R&D can be implemented. The current system
relies on the ability of producers to recoup R&D invest-
ments by charging a significant market premium above
production costs. If alternate models could be implemen-
ted that “de-link” medicine prices from R&D costs, many
of the thorny economic, logistical, and political problems
raised by tiered pricing could be averted. Proposals that
de-link prices from R&D include push funding, prizes
[50,51], patent pools [52], and patent buy-outs [53].
Furthermore, R&D policies could also incentivize develo-
pers to take production costs into account throughout
the development process, making affordability of the end
product more feasible. Some public-private product
development partnerships (PDPs) targeting resource-
poor settings already consider production costs when
deciding which compounds to pursue.
A political process is required to determine how coun-
tries should contribute to R&D financing as a global public
good. The debate on this issue advanced through the 2-
year WHO Intergovernmental Working Group on Public
Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property (IGWG,
2006-2008) process, which resulted in the Global Strategy
and Plan of Action on Public Health, Innovation and Intel-
lectual Property (GSPoA). It is too early to draw conclu-
sions, as implementation of the GSPoA is just beginning
and work continues on key questions regarding R&D
financing. Nevertheless, the international community is
clearly seeking policy solutions that extend beyond the
limited benefits of tiered pricing, in order to institute sys-
temic change that will improve access to medicines for all.
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